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ECLAC, transnational
corporations and the quest








This paper analyses the role assigned to foreign direct
investment and transnational corporations in the ECLAC
development project, examining the history of the institution
and its most representative publications. With impressive
continuity in its vision and policy recommendations, ECLAC
has recognized the need for foreign investment as an aid for
Latin American development, but has been cautious about
its consequences. ECLAC has continually called for close
scrutiny and regulation of the activities of transnational
corporations. The main idea underlying these
recommendations is that Latin American-owned industries
have to be the guiding forces of economic development. In
addition, ECLAC has consistently stressed the benefits of
Latin American integration in helping expand Latin
American industries, foster autochthonous research and
development and provide Latin American governments with
information and bargaining power vis-à-vis transnational
corporations.
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For, essentially, the debate is still defined by two principal questions:
one, where lies the responsibility for our lag?
In ourselves or in the outside world which exploits us? Two,
how can we make progress? By imitating others (the West or Russia)




The economic history of the last 50 years has been one
of impressive changes throughout the world. During
this period, Latin American countries have embarked
on a process of import substitution industrialization (ISI)
and have changed their relation to the international
economy significantly. ECLAC has played a key role in
this process. From its inception, when it provided a
concise theoretical framework from which ISI was
launched, and down to our own neoliberal times, its
analyses and recommendations have always played an
important role in Latin American intellectual and
political debates.
ISI was intended to reduce Latin America’s external
vulnerability and to put the region on the path of
development. However, the scarcity of investment
sources, lack of capital and technological disadvantage
were central and pervasive problems. This paper is an
attempt to trace how ECLAC addressed these problems
and to determine the role foreign capital and
transnational corporations (TNCs) were supposed to play
in the development strategy it envisaged. It will show
the role originally intended for foreign investment as
ISI was first proposed. It will deal with the way this
vision changed through the years, as the
industrialization process advanced and FDI and the
participation of TNCs in the region increased and
changed. It will also consider how these changes were
related to theoretical developments and challenges such
as dependency theory and neoliberal ideas. This will
be done by reviewing the different stages of ECLAC
thinking and interpreting the role played by FDI and
TNCs in each of them. It will suggest that, even though
significant changes have taken place, and the attention
paid to foreign capital and TNCs has increased through
the years, a similar view has persisted: FDI and TNCs
are useful or even necessary as a means of gaining
access to the capital and technology that can make
industrialization possible, since they can function as
sources of technological diffusion and economic
dynamism. However, a note of caution is always in
order: one must be aware of balance-of-payment crises
and any increase in foreign dependency. In view of all
this, ECLAC has proposed policies of selective
engagement and control of TNCs, a transitory role for
FDI, and regional integration. Throughout the period,
the idea that Latin American-owned industries should
be the guiding forces of economic development persists
in ECLAC thought.
This paper will trace the views of ECLAC regarding
TNCs during each of the five decades of its existence,
coinciding broadly with stages in its intellectual
development.1 The first part analyses the 1950s, when
ECLAC thinking was being developed. The concern with
foreign capital was present from the outset but increased
as the decade advanced, while the emphasis was on
attracting public funds. The second part analyses the
1960s, when the need to deal with TNCs became
imperative, and when their positive and negative
contributions were first evaluated, in the light of a
growing recognition that ISI needed to be reformed and
transcended. Moreover, the attention paid to TNCs and
foreign capital increased throughout the decade. During
the 1950s, the emphasis was on the need to attract
foreign public-sector capital. By the 1960s, and
increasingly thereafter, the need to deal with and attract
foreign private-sector investment gained ground. In this
stage, TNCs were viewed as a means of fostering exports
of manufactured goods (a view that appeared in the
1
 The periodization is based on Bielschowsky (1998a, pp. 11-12).
The author wishes to thank Joseph Love, Guillermo Guajardo,
Michael Monteón and two anonymous CEPAL Review referees for
their valuable and incisive comments.
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1950s and increased in importance in the following
decades), as the limits of ISI were becoming apparent
just as the importance of TNCs was increasing
worldwide. Next, the paper considers the 1970s, which
were marked by the analysis of “development styles”.
In this third stage, the emphasis was on the limits of
what TNCs could contribute, given the region’s style of
development. Moreover, the analysis of TNCs became a
central concern in ECLAC studies. Lastly, it analyses
the 1980s and 1990s, marked by the idea of “productive
transformation with equity”. The attention paid to TNCs
and foreign capital is even greater, especially since the
1990s saw a renewal of capital flows to the region and
a recognition of the need for more open economies.
The need to attract TNCs as sources of technology and
capital was highlighted. However, the idea that Latin
American firms must guide the development strategy
was maintained, and the positive aspects of ISI were
recognized. The international economic and intellectual
context is considered in every stage.
II
The 1950s: the early years
In 1949 (1950 in English), ECLAC published its
“manifesto” under the authorship of Raúl Prebisch,
setting forth the bases for its understanding of Latin
American economic problems (Prebisch, 1950). Its
starting point was the particular position as a
commodity producer and exporter that Latin America
had come to occupy in the international economic
system. This was a position that corresponded to the
postulates of the theory of comparative advantage.
However, according to Prebisch, the economic
performance and situation of the periphery contradicted
the prediction of the theory of comparative advantage
that the increases in productivity occurring in the
industrial countries would be transferred evenly
throughout the system. On the contrary, Prebisch
observed that the region’s terms of trade had been
deteriorating over the long term. This was caused, in
part, by the better organization skills of labour in the
centre. In the downswing of the economic cycle, these
groups resisted wage cuts. Rural workers in Latin
America lacked organization and so were not able to
resist downward wage pressures. This meant that the
adjustment needed in the centre was transferred to the
periphery. The other important factor was the
monopolistic power enjoyed by industries in the centre.
In later writings, another factor was introduced to
account for the deteriorating trend in the terms of trade.
This was the inelasticity of demand for commodities at
the centre. Known as Engel’s law, it stated that as
income grew, the share of demand accounted for by
commodities tended to decline. In the periphery, by
contrast, demand for industrial imports was elastic. This
explanation came to be known as the Prebisch-Singer
thesis, and became the hallmark of ECLAC.
If industrialization was needed to solve the region’s
problems, then the structural characteristics of the
periphery, the decline in its terms of trade, its low saving
rate and the technological disparity with the centre all
meant that the process needed to be one of import
substitution industrialization. The new industries,
therefore, should be encouraged and protected by the
State.
 Prebisch reflected that the imperative problem
posed by the lack of savings for investment meant there
was a need for resources other than those of the State.
One possibility he envisaged was foreign capital.2 While
the problem of foreign capital was present from the
start, it gained considerably more attention as the 1950s
advanced. The first systematic reflection on this aspect
appeared in 1954.3 Foreign capital “can be seen as a
way of securing the additional foreign exchange
resources needed to sustain a high rate of development
while at the same time eliminating the difference
between the demand for imports implied by this and
the regular revenues from exports themselves” (ECLAC,
1969, p. 33). It was also needed as a means of
supplementing internal savings.
2
 Despite the general belief that Prebisch had an anti-export bias,
he believed from the start that ISI did not mean “that primary exports
should be sacrificed”. They provided foreign exchange, and
therefore investments to enhance the agricultural exporting sector’s
productivity were needed (Prebisch, 1950).
3
 Prebisch did however address this issue in The economic
development of Latin America and its principal problems: “An
immediate increase in productivity per man could be brought about
by well-directed foreign investments added to present savings”
(Prebisch, 1950).
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The low level of foreign capital investment in Latin
America in the 1950s was a matter of great concern to
ECLAC.4 Prebisch explained that foreign investment had
played a major role in the previous development
strategy, especially the development of infrastructure
through FDI and the bond market. However, the bond
market had ceased to be accessible to Latin American
countries after the defaults of the 1930s. Therefore,
given the international situation and the need to lower
the cost of investments, he felt that the best solution
was foreign aid provided by international financial
institutions. These institutions should provide easy
access to funds so that Latin American countries could
invest in social capital (ECLAC, 1954, p. 15), “at least
until the private bond market is reopened” (ibid., p. 15).
He proposed a policy of international cooperation
whereby industrial countries would provide capital and
investments to Latin America, chiefly through these
international institutions. This did not need to be a kind
of Marshall Plan, because “Latin America’s need is for
productive loans on very long terms and at rates of
interest as low as those permitted by money markets”
(ibid., p. 22). He cautioned that this needed to be a
temporary form of relief, until the development of Latin
American industries allowed them to generate their own
resources. The desirability of foreign resources being
transitory in character was to remain a central concern
of ECLAC. Another important aspect was the need for
foreign capital to enter in amounts large enough to
produce favourable effects on the region’s
development.5 The goal of this policy was not only to
secure investment, but also to raise the saving rate and
encourage new investments (ECLAC, 1954). An
important proposal was that international funds should
be channelled to Latin American businesses through
specific State institutions. For example, recognizing the
institutional inadequacies of the region, notably its
financial institutions, ECLAC proposed the creation of
an Inter-American Fund for Industrial, Agricultural and
Mining Development. This fund, based on national
development plans for each country, would manage the
available resources.
The other problem Prebisch admitted was the
technological disadvantage faced by Latin American
industries and the high cost of keeping up to date and
obtaining technology from the centre. TNCs needed to
be involved in some way for Latin America to gain
access to the newest technology. This, however, had to
be done in a cautious and programmed way. TNCs should
not be active across the board; rather, their participation
should be guided by the State and confined to
determined sectors of the economy, ideally by means
of accords between industries for joint participation,
technological assistance and personnel training (ECLAC,
1954). This would allow Latin American industries to
compete from a better position. Indiscriminate
participation would hinder the aim of ISI. As in the case
of investments, Prebisch thought there was a need for
an international cooperation strategy through which the
advanced industrial countries would aid Latin America
with specific programmes of technological assistance.
Another related proposal, first raised in 1949, was
the creation of a Latin American Common Market
(Prebisch, 1950). The logic behind the proposal was
that this would give the new industries a larger market
and would encourage economies of scale, thereby
allowing Latin American industries to compete from a
stronger position. The inflow of FDI to the region could
be enhanced and controlled, in the way described above,
if it took place within the Common Market and was
subject to policies coordinated among Latin America’s
governments. This could be an important way of
reducing the region’s external vulnerability, if a regional
anticyclical policy were applied (ECLAC, 1954).
These ideas, however, were not in accord with the
post-war plans of the United States. The security goals
envisaged by American policy makers included the
integration of the Third World into the world economy,
but in a way that would ensure the international
economic environment was open to United States trade
and investment (Painter, 1999, p. 14). The ECLAC quest
for autonomy and control over foreign businesses
(which were mainly American in this period) was an
evident obstacle to the American project. Moreover,
while the United States Government encouraged the
integration process in Europe, a Latin American
integration project was seen as undesirable. Lastly,
Prebisch’s idea of economic assistance was not
successful, for the United States refused “requests for
economic assistance and looked to the military and
traditional elites to maintain a favourable climate for
foreign investment”. American, and therefore
international, assistance was directed mainly to Europe
and Asia (Painter, 1999, pp. 21-24). For the next 50
years, the resulting tension between the ECLAC project
and United States interests would remain a key source
of pressure for the acceptance of the ECLAC project.
4
 ECLAC estimated that FDI totalled only US$ 1.6 billion in the first
three years of the 1950s (ECLAC, 1954, pp.14-15).
5
 This was consistent with the reliance and stress that ECLAC placed
on programming. See Hirschman (1961).
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III
ISI transformed: the 1960s
The early years of ISI produced an ambiguous outcome.
On the one hand, nurtured by high protective tariffs
and expansionary State policies, industrialization
advanced at a rapid pace and the growth rate in the
Latin American countries was substantial.6 By the
1960s, industry had become the engine of the economy
in the largest countries, and was an increasingly
important sector across the region.7 However, the
process soon encountered serious problems. The most
evident one was that the import coefficient had risen
and shifted towards capital goods (Ffrench-Davis,
Muñoz and Palma, 1998, p. 190). As a result, not only
did balance-of-payments crises become more frequent,
but their impact became even more acute. Even more
than in the previous period, economic performance was
severely affected by external crises.
The 1960s also saw the birth and development of
dependency theory. This was the result of several
influences, but the problems of ISI referred to above
and disenchantment with industrialization as a means
of reducing external vulnerability were factors of the
utmost importance.8 In contrast with what Prebisch and
the early ECLAC writings had claimed, dependency
thinkers explained the underdevelopment of the
periphery not as a product of a particular development
strategy, but as a result of the development of the system.
The Cuban revolution implied that a more radical
approach than that of ECLAC was gaining ground in the
understanding of Latin American problems and
solutions.
However, the early 1960s witnessed a positive
international climate for ECLAC ideas, as the Kennedy
administration, concerned by the Cuban example,
changed its international security policies and turned
its attention in a more positive way towards Latin
America. Influenced by modernization theory, its idea
was that the “Communist threat” should be controlled
through the economic development of the Third World.
To this end, it launched the Alliance for Progress in
March 1961. US$ 20 billion in foreign aid was to be
channelled to the region under this programme over a
10-year period, with the United States Government
providing a large part. Of special importance was that
the ideas of planning and structural reform achieved
further legitimacy, as these were the aims of the Alliance
for Progress (Montecinos, 1997). Moreover, the
Alliance was in accord with Prebisch’s original idea
about the type of foreign investment needed in Latin
America. However, by the middle of the decade the
results of foreign aid were far from significant,
especially regarding structural reforms. The
discouraging results of Vietnam, increased instability
in the Third World and political turmoil at home led
United States foreign policy to turn away from aid and
the encouragement of economic development and to
focus on security instead, the result being support and
encouragement for military coups across the region
(Painter, 1999, pp. 63-64).
In the light of the real problems encountered by ISI
and the macroeconomic instability that ensued, and in
an intellectual climate marked by dependency theory,
ECLAC needed to revise its analysis and policy
recommendations.9 It entered this new stage in its
intellectual history with renewed analysis and
proposals. Contrary to what their critics have stated,
Prebisch and ECLAC reacted quickly to this new
situation.10 In Towards a dynamic development policy
for Latin America, Prebisch recognized and emphasized
the lack of dynamism of ISI. He found two main
problems: external and internal constraints (Prebisch,
1963, p. 15).
Given the external imbalances ISI had brought
about, Prebisch called for a deeper industrialization
6
 For an overview of the period and the economic performance of
the region, see Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz and Palma (1998, p. 187).
In the 1950s, Latin America’s GDP grew at a rate of 5.1%.
7
 By 1960 its share of GDP was 21% in the region as a whole, being
higher in the largest countries (Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz and Palma,
1998, p. 187).
8
 The origins of dependency theory are of course far more complex,
and the wide array of schools of dependency thinking makes them
even more difficult to determine. See Love (1996a, pp. 182-201).
9
 ECLAC never really endorsed dependency theory, but some of its
proponents worked in ECLAC. Furthermore, dependency theory
evolved from structuralist ideas, and even Prebisch helped develop
it and echoed it (Love, 1996b).
10
 For example, Harberger states that “good economics” faced the
bulwark of doctrinaire isolationism and protectionism: “the old
ECLAC, which actively sponsored and fostered the interventionist,
statist, and illiberal policies of the era” (Harberger, 1996, p. 306).
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process with a shift towards capital and intermediate
goods, which would ease balance-of-payments
constraints. External constraints had been created not
only by the rise in imports, but also by the lack of export
dynamism. Together with this problem, Prebisch
perceived a continuing decline in the periphery’s terms
of trade. For this reason, he claimed that there was an
urgent need to act on two fronts, increasing
manufactured exports to several markets (including
those of the centre) without neglecting traditional
exports, whilst taking steps to shore up the terms of
trade (Prebisch, 1963, p. 102). Also important as a way
of promoting exports was the integration of the Latin
American countries into a Common Market (Ffrench-
Davis, Muñoz and Palma, 1998).
ECLAC was now also emphasizing the importance
of the region’s social problems.11 “The social structure
prevalent in Latin America constitutes a serious obstacle
to technical progress and, consequently, to economic
and social development” (Prebisch, 1963, p. 4). It was
“no longer feasible to maintain consumption patterns
that imply the dissipation of a substantial capital
formation potential” (ibid., p. 13). Structural reforms
(such as agrarian reform) were now considered
essential. “Latin America must quicken its rate of
economic development and redistribute income in
favour of the broad masses of the population” (ibid.,
p. 10).
ISI had aggravated the external constraints, and the
problems of capital and investment continued.
Furthermore, the nature of the industries developing in
Latin America meant that the region still faced a
significant technological disadvantage. At least in the
largest and most advanced countries, ISI had reached a
dead end (Prebisch, 1963). A policy was needed to
restrict the consumption of the higher-income groups
and encourage exports. However, there was still a need
for foreign capital, investment and technology if the
ECLAC strategy was to be effective. “We need the outside
world to help us to cultivate our own ability, so that the
population as a whole can be brought to share in the
process of development” (Prebisch, 1963, p. 54). As
before, foreign investment was needed on a temporary
basis until the region could generate its own resources
and technology.
The role of FDI and TNCs was therefore
reinterpreted in this new stage. This review was
influenced not only by the general developments
already mentioned, but also by disenchantment with
the previous strategy. Prebisch had set store by
international public aid and financial institutions, but
this had not solved the problems. In the 1950s, FDI had
accounted for 60% of all capital movements. By the
early 1960s, however, in the spirit of the Alliance for
Progress, the focus had shifted to official lending, again
in accord with Prebisch’s ideas (Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz
and Palma, 1998).
In the 1960s the emphasis, where foreign capital
was concerned, shifted towards FDI and TNCs. Prebisch
now claimed that in this new era a “clear distinction
must be made between two types of foreign capital:
the out-dated type, with the enclaves which still subsist,
and the new type which takes a determined share in the
intensive process of industrialization” (Prebisch, 1963,
p. 54). “The foreign enterprise must be a nucleus for
the dissemination of technology” (ibid., p. 54). But even
if the participation of TNCs and FDI was seen in a more
positive light, concerns about their presence and
suspicions as to the real gains it might bring were still
expressed. One problem was the enormous profits some
companies made. “The profit incentive is clearly
essential if foreign private enterprise is to be attracted.
However, it should be the consequence of the advanced
techniques such firms bring into the country, the new
patterns of production, organization and marketing they
introduce into the local milieu.” (ibid., p. 55). This was
not what usually happened in practice, however, owing
to excessive protection and inflation. TNCs could play a
role, provided this was firmly regulated and guided as
part of a clear development programme. This meant a
strong governmental stance to define the place TNCs
could occupy. Prebisch thought TNCs could play an
important part in a “programme designed to encourage
exports”, as they brought “knowledge of export
practices and external markets” in which Latin
American industries were at a disadvantage (ibid., p.
56). ECLAC had recognized the need to encourage
exports since the 1950s, and in the 1960s this idea would
become a central tenet of its proposals (Bielschowsky,
1998a, pp. 22-23). Prebisch now thought that TNCs
could be of help in this endeavour. Again, a “partnership
between foreign and Latin American enterprise might
be a very suitable solution, from the standpoint both of
dissemination of techniques and of improved relations
with domestic interests” (Prebisch, 1963, p. 56). In
short, underlying all these proposals was the need for
11
 This coincided with a change in the perception of development
in economic theory, away from an approach that equated
development with GDP growth and towards one in which social
aspects were part of the definition of development. See Arndt (1987,
chapter 4).
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definite, clear policies such as tax exemptions.
“Otherwise, foreign investment might carry undue
weight in some branches of economic activity, which
would be undesirable from various points of view”
(ibid., p. 56). Given the cautious stance towards TNCs,
the solutions to this dilemma that Prebisch envisaged
were, on the one hand, to progress with regional
integration. This would give rise to more efficient
industrialization in the region, again because of
specialization, complementarity, larger markets and
economies of scale. This being the case, Latin American
industry could “stand up to foreign enterprise, either
by making common cause with it or by competing on
an equal footing” (ibid., p. 99). Again, the integration
process could also foster autochthonous research and
development (R&D), as there would be more incentives
for industries, and this would facilitate policy
coordination among Latin American States to
encourage R&D. A complementary part of the strategy
was that States should take definite action to promote
research that could yield more appropriate and efficient
technology.
Alongside State regulation of TNCs, another
important idea that appeared in this period –one that
should be related to Prebisch’s unceasing quest for an
international cooperation programme– was the proposal
for an international code of conduct to regulate the
operations of TNCs. This could be seen as a response to
the obvious fact that TNCs were increasing their
operations in the region. It is important to note that this
was also raised by Prebisch as an important concern at
the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).12
As mentioned, dependency ideas appeared and
developed, in part, at ECLAC during the 1960s. The
younger generation working under the dependency
paradigm also reflected on the role of foreign capital
and TNCs. Prominent among these economists was the
Chilean Osvaldo Sunkel. For Sunkel, “it could be argued
that until the mid-1950s, what prevailed were forms
and methods of incorporating external financial, human,
technological and material resources that contributed
to the development of an essentially national industry
in Latin America. From then on, however, with the
decades of crisis and the Second World War now left
behind, and coinciding with the rapid expansion of
transnational conglomerates and a new stage in the
import substitution process in Latin America, the phase
of denationalization and dispersion of Latin American
industry began” (Sunkel, 1998, p. 513). The latter
development, Sunkel thought, was one of the most
important factors behind the disappointing results that
the industrialization process had yielded (ibid., p. 513).
Furthermore, Sunkel thought that the world was
probably “moving towards a new variant of the centre-
periphery model, from which we thought that import
substitution industrialization was liberating us”. In this
new model, “the international division of labour was
taking on a new form, as were its agents: the
transnational manufacturing oligopolies” (ibid., p. 515).
This model had important consequences, especially the
persistence and deepening of the mono-exporting
model, the fact that the economy’s dynamic influence
came from abroad, and the location of basic decision-
making centres abroad. Sunkel also thought that that
the growing presence of TNCs would increase the
problem of external indebtedness. Lastly, Sunkel
warned that the process of Latin American integration
could ruin Latin American industries once and for all
by favouring firms from outside the region. This could
happen if conditions were created in which “domestic
companies are not only disadvantaged, but debarred
from obtaining protection from the national State”
(ibid., p. 516). Summing up, he said that “the main
characteristic of the current system of international
economic relations, and probably of the future system
as well, is the penetration of the economies of
underdeveloped countries by the most powerful agents
of developed country economies [TNCs], and especially
by those of the American economy, the predominant
centre of the capitalist system today” (ibid., p. 66).
12
 Prebisch left ECLAC and was appointed Director of UNCTAD in
1964. He left that post in 1969, disappointed by the lack of support
and what he considered the organization’s lack of achievement.
See Dosman and Pollock (1998, pp. 573-603).
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IV
The landslide and “styles of development”: the 1970s
Since the mid-1950s, governments throughout the
region had striven unreservedly to attract FDI and TNCs.
This period saw a significant increase in the inflow of
FDI to Latin America, attracted by high rates of
protection. New TNCs entered the region to occupy
leading positions in the production of manufactured and
intermediate goods. This outcome was a
disappointment, however, for “capital was often raised
locally, many investments represented the purchase of
an existing firm and there was no guarantee that the
seller would reinvest the proceeds locally” (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1994, p. 359). This phenomenon only
increased during the 1960s, as international trade and
notably trade in manufactures continued to grow
spectacularly. ISI had now advanced to a further stage
in the larger countries, but the problems only became
starker. Political and economic instability, rising
inflation and more acute external imbalances became
common phenomena in the region’s countries. These
economic and political developments, and the
pervasiveness of dependency theory, had the effect of
spreading a negative view of ISI. The role that FDI and
TNCs had come to play in Latin America only reinforced
the suspicions of dependency theorists, who were rising
to prominence in intellectual circles in both Latin
America and the developed world.13
When the 1970s began, the Latin American
countries faced even more constant external concerns
and instability. The 1973 oil shock put an end to the
“golden age” and initiated a period of international
financial instability and reduced growth in the industrial
countries, coupled with rising inflation. The effects of
this crisis put enormous pressures on the development
strategy followed by Latin America, especially for oil
importing countries. This period also witnessed a rise
in the standing of monetarist schools that attacked the
ISI strategy ferociously.
In spite of all the problems, the enormous financial
flows available in the international market allowed Latin
American countries to continue without serious
reforms, by following a debt-led strategy. This situation
meant that these countries’ foreign debts were to grow
significantly throughout the decade. Nevertheless,
several governments across the region were trying to
encourage industrial exports. In fact, manufactured
exports continued to grow throughout this period,
although never to the level necessary to relieve the
shortage of foreign currency (Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz
and Palma, 1998).
In this situation ECLAC entered its third stage,
characterized by the idea of “development styles”
(Bielschowsky, 1998b, p. 34). The idea was that the
problem of Latin America lay in the style of
development being followed. It was basically claimed
that the essential issue lay in the social and political
structure and in the relationships of power and
inequality that sprang from it.14 It was the distribution
of power and income that determined the outcome of
the development strategy. Therefore, for an
industrialization process to be successful, the main
problem to be tackled was income distribution. This
was not a new idea, but it acquired more analytical
importance and was recast in a broader framework. The
same could be said of the need for manufactured
exports, an idea that gained importance at this time.
The economic importance of TNCs was such that
ECLAC recognized that “there could be no doubt that
the future of the region must perforce envisage various
degrees and forms of coexistence with this type of
economic unit” (ECLAC, 1981). The attention paid to
TNCs in ECLAC studies grew significantly, and they
became a central focus of concern rather than an aspect
of broader analyses.
Aníbal Pinto, analysing the internationalization of
the post-war economy, acknowledged that TNCs had
come to play the leading role in the most dynamic
13
 It has to be noted, however, that one of the most prominent of
them, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, did not have such a negative
view of TNCs. This could be seen even in Dependency and
development, but appeared much more clearly after he coined the
notion of “associated-dependent” development. Cardoso
maintained that to view TNCs as opposed to growth and development
was wrong. For him, TNCs needed a dynamic market to work and so
could actually foster both growth and development. Given the
characteristics of the international system and the periphery,
attracting TNCs was a feasible way for peripheral countries to attain
their potential rate of development (Cardoso, 1973, pp. 142-176).
14
 The main expression for these ideas is found in Pinto (1976,
pp. 99-130).
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sectors of Latin American economies, especially the
largest ones (Pinto, 1980, p. 42). By the late 1960s,
TNC penetration in manufacturing was particularly
marked, with foreign firms accounting for between 30%
and 40% of total output in the largest countries (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1994, p. 315).
TNCs had come into Latin America and adapted to
the region’s particular “style of development”, marked
by its unequal income distribution. There was a
“contradiction between the transnational objectives of
these enterprises and the national objectives aimed at
securing an integrative and autonomous style of
development… At the internal level, it is expressed in
particular through the orientation of the structure of
production, which is adapted to the restrictive and elitist
demand of the strata with the highest income, while at
the external level it is reflected in the incapacity of the
transnational corporations to solve the problems of the
external bottleneck, which they may even help to make
worse, and in their real and potential role with regard
to the regional integration processes” (Marinho, 1981,
p. 9).15 FDI and a major presence for TNCs were now
recognized as inevitable, but they could only have a
positive impact (in the original sense of being transitory
and regulated and occupying a limited, albeit key,
position) if the social structure and the style of
development were changed. The emphasis on
manufactured exports and the continuing promotion of
regional integration were of a piece with the original
ECLAC idea that if development was to come, Latin
American industries, within a reformed social structure,
had to be the guiding force. Aníbal Pinto, however,
recognized that the participation of TNCs was
problematic, but that with appropriate regulation and
pressure they could be directed towards exporting
activities, and so it did not appear advisable to “reject
outright or excessively curtail the hypothesis of a larger
contribution by foreign consortia to industrial-export
diversification”. It would largely depend on how
national policies were put into practice (Pinto, 1980,
p. 140).
These proposals were part of what came to be
known as the “new international economic order”
(NIEO). Strongly associated with UNCTAD, and arguably
a logical result of Prebisch’s ideas, this became the new
framework within which the region was expected to
act. At the third regional appraisal in Guatemala in 1977,
the idea of a new international development strategy
within the NIEO came to the fore. It was recommended
that “strong encouragement should be given to the work
aimed at preparing the international code of conduct
governing the activities of transnational corporations”
(ECLAC, 1977). Furthermore, governments were now
in a better position to negotiate with and control TNCs,
since their experience gave them more bargaining
power. Not only this, but Latin American countries
should share information to increase their collective
bargaining power vis-à-vis TNCs. They should also
develop measures to promote the restructuring of world
industrial production, in particular by securing greater
access for manufactured products from developing
countries through the reduction of trade restrictions and
regulation of TNCs. Easier access to technology should
also be guaranteed to developing economies. But as
always, it was Latin American industries and
technologies that had to be developed. There was an
imperative need to create or strengthen institutions in
the region that could engage in R&D or facilitate its
transfer.
As the decade advanced, the ideas of ECLAC were
faced with their strongest challenges ever. In a
politically polarized climate, its reformist stance was
losing appeal.16 The United States Government had
changed its attitude and was supporting and
encouraging military interventions to counter the
Communist threat. Guerrilla movements throughout the
region, a socialist government in Chile and the
organized NIEO movement had further polarized the
international political environment.
This situation led to further radicalization of
dependency theory, and gave it a wider appeal. In the
developed world, orthodox monetarist economic ideas
were gaining ground in academic circles and, towards
the end of the decade, in political ones too. A campaign
against the “bad economists”, those associated with
ECLAC, had begun in United States academic circles in
the 1950s. As the structuralist school was branded
unprofessional, a professional project was launched to
promote “correct” (i.e., monetarist) economics in Latin
America.17 ECLAC thus became trapped between the
more radical critics (followers of dependency theory)
15
 Marinho was a staff member of the ECLAC/UNCTAD Joint Unit on
Transnational Corporations.
16
 ECLAC reformism had its limits since it was an international agency
and, at a theoretical level, always assumed the State to be an
exogenous factor (Love, 1996b, p. 242).
17
 This was done by funding and creating new institutions and by
attracting Latin Americans to graduate schools in the United States.
The most exemplary case was the accord between the University
of Chicago and the Pontificia Universidad Católica in Chile. See
Montecinos (1997, pp. 291-295).
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and conservative monetarists. Meanwhile, in the
Southern Cone brutal military dictatorships were
applying monetarist programmes and making the first
efforts to abandon the industry-led strategy. The case
of Chile is significant: not only had ECLAC ideas played
an important role in reformist policy-making in Chile
during the 1960s, but its headquarters were located in
that country. These attacks on ECLAC structuralism, like
the military coups in the Southern Cone, could be
related to the clash between the autonomous, regulatory
stance of ECLAC and United States business and security
interests. The failure of the Alliance for Progress had
given rise to a change in United States foreign policy
that was increasingly favourable to military
interventions and distrustful of what United States
officials saw as subversive ideas. Lastly, the state of
crisis in the United States economy and the competition
it now faced from Japan and Europe implied that any
attempt to curtail American business interests –
especially in the region, where they were hegemonic–
needed to be a matter of concern.
 The 1970s were also a high point for foreign
investment, although it came mainly in the form of
financial flows and external debt. The “debt-led growth”
strategy would come to an abrupt end in 1982. The
region now faced the need to adjust its economies while
at the same time dealing with their debt problems in an
extremely unfavourable external environment.
V
From debt adjustment to “productive
transformation”: the beleaguered 1980s and 1990s
The besieged position of ECLAC meant that the emphasis
on development and production shifted towards a
position of opposition to the type of adjustment
demanded by the lending banks and IMF (Bielschowsky,
1998b, p. 37). The fourth stage in ECLAC thought was
driven by the objective of finding a way out for the
region as it faced inevitable adjustment. The main
proposal was for “expansionary adjustment”. This
required an agreement between lenders and Latin
American countries as well as a less strict use of fiscal
and monetary policies. ECLAC saw this as the only way
in which adjustment could be carried out without further
damaging the social conditions of the region.
The mid-1980s saw the appearance of new
theoretical reflections that transcended the adjustment
problems. This is the stage that still permeates ECLAC
thinking. Primarily in the works of Fernando
Fajnzylber, the main concern was to re-evaluate the ISI
experience and to reflect on the feasibility of an
industrializing strategy (Fajnzylber, 1990). Central to
this reappraisal was the success story of the newly
industrializing countries in East Asia. In this light,
ECLAC tried to confront the problems of the past and
find a way of remedying them. The ISI strategy had not
managed to solve the problems of social inequality,
mainly because of its lack of technological absorption.
The Asian example allowed ECLAC to maintain its stress
both on industrialization and on State intervention.18
These ideas would crystallize in the proposal for
“productive transformation with equity” that was to
mark ECLAC analyses through the 1990s (ECLAC, 1990).
What was needed now was a “new industrialization”
that would put emphasis on the need for “technological
progress”. In the 1990s, the need for a competitive
external strategy complemented these early ideas, with
industrialization being seen as the core of productive
transformation. As part of this new strategy, Latin America
should also address the problems of poverty and inequality
through definite measures of income redistribution
(ECLAC, 1990).
The position of ECLAC in the 1990s was a feeble
one, given the dominance of the Washington Consensus
ideas. These ideas had gained importance through the
agency of IMF and the World Bank during the 1980s, as
these institutions played the leading roles in the debt
negotiation process of the 1980s and the structural
reform processes of the 1990s. Furthermore, the
attempts to debunk structuralist ideas (launched, as we
have seen, in the 1950s) had finally been successful, as
the economists trained under these programmes came
18
 It is interesting that the World Bank and IMF have interpreted the
Asian experience in a different light and have used it to justify
their free market proposals. See World Bank (1993).
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to occupy the highest positions in Latin American
governments. The end of the Cold War (1989-1991),
with the United States predominant, only gave further
strength and support to these new ideas. Moreover, this
dominance meant that the proposals of ECLAC had lost
such little leverage as they enjoyed.19 In this climate,
ECLAC had to respond and adapt its ideas.
An important element in this new period, and in
the way ECLAC confronted the demanding and hostile
intellectual and political climate, was the organization’s
assessment of the actual achievements of ISI. While
recognizing the problems, shortcomings and abuses
associated with it, and particularly the negative aspects
of State intervention and its lack of emphasis on market
forces, ECLAC took a positive view of these
achievements. This was essential, given that neoliberal
thought blamed ISI for the apparent economic failure
of the region,20 claiming that it had resulted in the
emergence of inefficient industries which had hindered
Latin American economic performance. In response,
the proposal of the Washington Consensus was to let
free markets and an open economy restore efficiency.
Any encouragement of industries was seen as “populist”
and thus negative (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991).
In the view of ECLAC, not only had Latin America
seen high rates of growth during the “golden age”
(1950-1973), but ISI had been more positive than was
previously thought in terms of technological learning
and development. This provided a strong base from
which the region could engage in a transformation
towards a more dynamic, competitive and outward-
looking industrial sector (Katz, 1998, pp. 63-75).
The 1990s also marked the return of Latin
American countries to the international financial
markets after the debt crisis. The 1980s had seen a
decline in flows to the region and in the percentage of
total international flows it received.21 Furthermore, the
1990s were a decade in which the international
economic situation was characterized by increasing
flows of FDI, with what were now called the “emerging
economies” playing an important role.22 The
privatization process in Latin America exerted a great
attraction on these flows. The dominant neoliberal
consensus regards FDI and TNCs as desirable elements
of a good economic situation. In an open, globalized
economy, governments should facilitate them and create
positive conditions to attract them. Policies that either
hinder this or seek to encourage national industries are
regarded as counterproductive and unsound by the
Washington Consensus.
 By contrast with the commercial bank loans which
predominated in the late 1970s, foreign investment in
the 1990s went mainly into services and productive
investments (ECLAC, 2000). These changes prompted a
renewed interest in TNCs in ECLAC studies. An important
finding was the way these companies’ participation in
the Latin American economies had changed over recent
decades (Stumpo, 1998). Whereas during the ISI years
TNCs had tended to invest in intermediate and
consumption goods, since the mid 1970s and early
1980s, when Latin American governments were seeking
to transform ISI strategy, the bulk of FDI has gone into
commodity manufacturing for export. This finding
gives support to the original ECLAC claim that TNCs
cannot be the guiding forces of development. Important
though they might be, the need for technologically
advanced industries can only be met from within Latin
America itself.
By recognizing the benefits of ISI, by taking the
example of East Asia and by showing the shortcomings
of what TNCs have to offer the region, ECLAC –in
contrast to the Washington Consensus– still promotes
positive policies that can help Latin American
industries, while recognizing the need for more open
economies and freer markets. The imperative is to foster
the absorption of the latest technology by Latin
American industries so that they can compete
internationally. Even if TNCs can help foster exports in
certain periods and in certain sectors, the soundness of
the region’s position in international markets will
“depend on the existence and progress of national firms
capable of competing –either on their own or with the
aid of inputs of foreign capital– against the firms
supplying the international market” (ECLAC, 1990,
p. 75). Productive transformation with equity has to take
place in a context of higher international
competitiveness, grounded in a “deliberate and
systematic absorption of technical progress”. This
implies that “proper account must be taken of the need
for learning and dissemination of internationally
available know-how” (ibid., p. 14). Both technological
and human capital advances have to be absorbed so
19
 The current proposal for a free trade area of the Americas, led by
the United States Government, is a clear example of this.
20
 For example, Arnold Harberger thinks that the situation in Latin
America improved once “good economics” (that taught at the
University of Chicago) replaced the “bad economics” of ECLAC.
See Harberger (1996, p. 303).
21
 1991 was the first year since the debt crisis in which the region
saw a positive transfer of resources (ECLAC, 1995, p. 26).
22
 In 1998, these flows reached US$ 650 billion. Still, the bulk of
capital flows went to developed economies. In 1997 the proportion
was 59%, and in 1998 it was 71% of the total. See ECLAC (2000).
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that productivity, competitiveness and equity can be
improved. According to ECLAC, this has been a
neglected aspect in Latin America.
 Studies that analyse TNCs and the flows of FDI to
the region in the 1990s help ECLAC to hold out against
the refusal of support for Latin American industries
suggested by the Washington Consensus. As in its early
stages, it expects TNCs and FDI to have positive effects,
and there is a clear awareness of the need to encourage
and attract foreign capital and technology. ECLAC
believes, however, that these will never be a substitute
for actual Latin American industries, if the region is to
develop and tackle its social problems. Another
important element in the ECLAC view is its stress on the
example provided by Latin American TNCs that have
managed to grow and expand successfully, which are
thought to be possible sources of economic dynamism
(Chudnovsky, 1999). This allows another old idea to
be maintained: the importance and desirability of
regional integration. Although progress has been weak,
regional integration has helped to promote trade in
manufactured products across the region.23
 Lastly, the impressive flows of FDI to the region
since the 1990s have made it a matter of renewed
importance for some sort of regulation to be in place.
State regulation is obviously recognized as necessary,
but it is weakened by the lack of adequate information.
Reviving its old argument about the importance of
governments having adequate information and
experience to give them bargaining power vis-à-vis
TNCs, ECLAC is pursuing studies that should help Latin
American governments to regulate TNCs and FDI. In
1999, for example, two shortcomings were recognized:
lack of statistical evidence, and regulatory challenges,
given the number of channels and agreements through
which FDI is directed (ECLAC, 2000).
VI
Conclusions
As the example of the 1990s shows, ECLAC has
continued with its quest to promote a development
strategy based on modern industry and technology that
will allow Latin America to follow an autonomous path
towards development and equity. Throughout the 50-
year period we have considered, the Latin American
and world economies have both changed significantly.
In each period, Latin America’s relationship with the
international economy and with foreign investment has
changed its form. The last decade has also been one in
which ideological trends are far from coinciding with
ECLAC ideas. Globalization, FDI and the participation
of TNCs are currently seen as the desired means of
development for “emerging countries”.24 Nevertheless,
ECLAC continues its effort to understand these changes
within the same framework and under the same
assumptions it originally used. By doing this, it strives
to preserve its own idea of what a Latin American
development strategy should be. These assumptions and
their framework shape its understanding of the nature
of foreign investment.
This paper has shown that the position taken by
ECLAC towards TNCs and FDI has been a coherent and
consistent one through its five decades of existence.
This position implies recognition of the need for foreign
investment, but has been marked by awareness of the
dangers and drawbacks of an uncritical reliance on
outside capital. It has also shown that, its continuity
notwithstanding, the analysis of ECLAC has adapted and
responded to changing economic and ideological
conditions, but without compromising its basic position.
The issues of FDI and TNCs are complicated and
crucial ones in Latin America, and the likelihood that
interdependence will increase and international trade
continue to grow tends to render them even more
important. In an age when the theoretical consensus
tends to disregard the problematic nature of FDI and
adopt an attitude of blind faith towards open markets,
and when the problems and vulnerability of the region
seem to be increasing, the critical effort of ECLAC, if
understood in its own framework, is an important voice
striving to address and elucidate them.
23
 In the years leading up to the 1980s debt crisis, intraregional
exports doubled as a share of the Latin American industry total.
The main drawback, particularly in the small and medium-sized
countries, was that they were unable to provide ISI with the “critical
mass” in terms of market size and the degree of competitiveness
required for success in the long run (Ffrench-Davis, Muñoz and
Palma, 1998, p. 213).
24
 Except of course by the “globalophobics”, as Mexico’s former
president Ernesto Zedillo so strangely termed those who
demonstrate at every meeting of international leaders.
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